In defense of bilateral investment treaties by Schwebel, Stephen M.
 Columbia FDI Perspectives 
Perspectives on topical foreign direct investment issues 
No. 135   November 24, 2014 
Editor-in-Chief: Karl P. Sauvant (Karl.Sauvant@law.columbia.edu) 
Managing Editor: Adrian P. Torres (adrian.p.torres@gmail.com) 
 
 






The creation of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) is the boldest step in the modern history of international cooperation on the 
protection of foreign investment. It has furthered the flourishing of arbitration 
between investors and states, itself one of the most progressive developments in 
international law of the past sixty years. Since Germany concluded the first bilateral 
investment treaty (BIT) with Pakistan in 1959, some 3,000 BITs have been 
concluded. Yet, there are reports that the European Union (EU), led by Germany, may 
exclude investor-state arbitration from the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) with the United States (US), impairing the ubiquity of investor-
state arbitration. 
 
Opponents of investor-state arbitration claim that it faces a “legitimacy crisis.” There 
are three essential contentions advanced by such critics: (1) tribunals are biased 
toward multinational enterprises; (2) arbitration is asymmetrical because of investors’ 
freedom to bring claims against states, while states cannot bring claims against 
investors; and (3) arbitral awards are often conflicting. These criticisms are more 
colorful than they are cogent.  
With regard to bias, Susan Franck’s research concluded that, of 144 publicly available 
awards as of January 2012, states won 87 cases when arbitrators resolved a dispute 
arising under a treaty, while investors won 57.
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 Her research further showed that, 
even when investors were awarded damages, they won significantly less than the 
amount claimed, and that about a quarter of investment claims were dismissed at the 
jurisdictional stage. These findings hardly suggest bias against states. 
 
Second, though the international investment process is indeed asymmetrical, states 
can, and have, brought counterclaims against investors. Arbitral rules, such as those 
of ICSID and UNCITRAL, expressly authorize counterclaims. In any event, any 
suggested imbalance is exaggerated since states not only have police powers, but the 
police; their means of exerting pressure upon foreign investors are multiple. The 
ability of the investor to initiate arbitration only mitigates that imbalance. 
 
Moreover, to the extent that BITs constrain states’ ability to regulate investment, 
critics of investor-state arbitration fail to consider that the very purpose of treaties is 
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to constrain the freedom of states. Notwithstanding this inherent constraint, states that 
enter into BITs are free to confirm and specify their rights to regulate within their 
borders, as demonstrated by some recent model BITs. Legitimate questions may arise 
about how far BIT provisions bear upon those rights. If those questions have not been 
settled by the terms of the BIT, they can be dealt with through recourse to the treaty’s 
mechanism for dispute settlement. To cast aside investor-state arbitration because of 
an unrealized apprehension of adverse effects upon states would be a profound 
misjudgment of the procedures for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. 
 
Finally, the inconsistency of some arbitral awards hardly justifies denouncing 
investor-state arbitration. Admittedly, cases sometimes assert conflicting 
interpretations of BIT provisions, and conflicts in interpretation are, of course, 
undesirable. But in view of the decentralized, horizontal nature of the international 
system, they are not unusual. In fact, even in the relatively centralized, hierarchical 
judicial systems of a state, conflicts among courts are common, aptly demonstrated by 
the inconsistencies that exist between state and federal jurisprudence in the US. 
Moreover, conflicting interpretations of similar provisions in BITs often arise because 
tribunals are responding to differences in the facts of each case.  
 
To address some of these criticisms, opponents of investor-state arbitration have 
proposed the establishment of a tenured appellate court, such as the Appellate Body 
of the World Trade Organization. In principle, this proposal is appealing; but it would 
present many difficulties, as ICSID found when it examined the possibility. 
Furthermore, states have shown little disposition toward taking this path. 
 
Another course proposed by opponents is for national courts to settle investor-state 
disputes. However, national courts may find themselves constrained by state 
immunities, or subject to political influence, corruption or simply be nationalistic in 
their perception of the facts and the law. Accordingly, it is perfectly reasonable for 
foreign investors to prefer international arbitration, just as many thousands of parties 
engaging in international commerce have for many years.    
 
Acceptance of investor-state arbitration should not suggest that there are no areas for 
improvement. For example, arbitrators encounter many tactical challenges, and 
tribunals or institutions should be empowered to impose sanctions on parties or their 
counsel who abuse the making of challenges.  
 
Another reform that merits consideration is institutionalizing security for costs. 
Special purpose vehicles may bring thin claims against states, thereby imposing a 
financial burden on states. Even if the state wins the arbitration and is awarded costs, 
it may find that the special purpose vehicle used by the claimant lacks the funds to 
pay costs. It is toward shortcomings such as these that reform efforts should be 
directed. 
 
International investment law is a profoundly progressive development of international 
law: it should be nurtured rather than restricted and denounced. The substitution of 
national adjudication for international investment arbitration would be a regressive 
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